A Political Approach to China’s Confucius Institute: An observation of its understanding of ethnicity, language and identity by LEE Kyoungtaek
A Political Approach to China’s Confucius
Institute: An observation of its understanding











A Political Approach to China’s Confucius Institute:  




Doctoral Program in International and Advanced Japanese Studies 
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences 





In this paper, I will examine the ideas of the Chinese government regarding concepts of 
ethnicity, language and identity. This examination will provide clarity by which to 
estimate the direction towards which Chinese government policies are committed. 
Particularly, this research will focus on the language policy pursued by the Chinese 
government through the Confucius Institute. In this sphere, I will research the activities 
and specifics of the Chinese government’s language policy conducted both internally 
and externally in order to understand the whole aspect of its language policy. After 
analyzing the connection between these activities and the specifics of the Chinese 
language policy, I will finally extract and summarize the characteristic features of the 
Confucius Institute as the external language policy instrument of the Chinese 
government.  
 














In this paper, I will examine the ideas of the Chinese government regarding concepts of 
ethnicity, language and identity. This examination will help clarify and provide the means 
for an estimation of the direction of Chinese government policies. More particularly, this 
research will focus on the language policy pursued by the Chinese government through 
the Confucius Institute. In this sphere, I will research the activities and specifics of the 
Chinese government’s language policy conducted internally and externally in order to 
understand the whole aspect of its language policy. After analyzing the connection 
between these activities and the specifics of Chinese language policy with consideration 
given to the history of development regarding external language policy, I will finally 
extract and summarize the characteristic features of the Confucius Institute as the external 
language policy instrument of the Chinese government. I believe this research could 
provide a theoretical framework by which to measure not only China’s language policy 
but also that of any other given country’s policies. 
 
 
2. Political approaches to language and language education 
 
According to E. J. Hobsbawm (1990: 71-79), languages in the modern era in Europe 
were regarded as symbols of the nation, in the same manner as were religion and the 
holy icons of the middle ages. Hobsbawm continues that, a community called ‘the 
nation’ which is based on localism is just an arbitrary group based on the support of the 
inhabitants of its small territory. But, from the late nineteenth century, that community 
was transformed into a polity which had the ability to control power. Furthermore, the 
meaning of nationalism was emphasized for the unity of the nation. In the process, the 
common linguistic and cultural features of a group were practical methods of 
identifying each group. Especially the written language and its education played a main 
role in emphasizing nationalism and reproducing the nation (Hobsbawm 1990: 113-114). 
Hobsbawm summarized the character of linguistic nationalism with the phrase: “At all 
events problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or 







Concerning the strong connection between a common language and nationalism, B. 
Anderson (1991: 67-82) took the examples of some countries which had used the 
‘National Print Language’ for unifying the country’s administrations and A. Gellner 
(2006: 42-48) remarked on the role of language as a substitution for religion. Such 
understandings of language and the purpose of language education gave society the 
opportunity of reproducing effectively. Particularly the intervention of politics in 
language education was taken for granted as a legitimate method of unifying the state 
and the nation (Gellner 2006: 49-59).  
 
R. Schmidt (2006: 98) analyzed the power concerning language and political 
intervention in language as having two directions. One is the politics of unifying the 
state by opting for an official language, and the other is the politics of identity which 
proclaims the right of minority communities to their languages as W. Kymlicka 
advocates. These two directions have conflicting features. In short, the politics of 
identity were undertaken to refute the concept of unification through the designation of 
one official language. In this manner, the politics of identity rely mainly on the 
ethnicities, cultures and languages of minority communities in order to emphasize their 
diversity. For example, S. Hall (1991: 59), who supports the politics of identity, stated 
that it was tailored to the needs of minority communities in obtaining the right of speech 
in public spaces. S. Hall continued to say that the concept of identity was not essential 
but constructed1. In other words, from his concept of identity, states and nations are not 
inherent and unchangeable, but accidental and strategic (Hall 2001: 11). Besides the 
controversy whether identity is essential or constructed, the concept of identity has 
another problem in relation to the existence of group-identity, i.e. in the case where the 
existence of group-identity is admitted, forcing the members of that given group to act 
only for the survival of their group is justified. Actually such actions justified by 
group-identity are inclined to ignore the diversity supported by respective members of a 
given group. It seems that the politics of identity is a contradictory concept, but there 
lies an important point. That is, even though the politics of identity advocate the identity 
of minorities, it denies the strong connection between identity, culture, and language. In 
short, the politics of identity strategically adopt the concept of identity only as a 
counteraction against the power of the identity of the majority. When the politics of 
identity emphasize the identity of minorities, it attaches great importance to the cultural 
and linguistic features of minority communities. This is the reason why these factors are 
easily regarded as the core of identity. With regard to this point of view concerning 
culture and language, I would like to refer to the comments of the sociolinguist T. 
Yasuda. Yasuda (2006: 130) briefly explains the connection between culture and 
  
language as “the integration of culture and language”. In order to explain the position of 
language transformed into an important factor of identity, Yasuda took the example of 
culture. He suggested that, after the meaning of culture had been changed for use as an 
important factor of identity, language became sub-categorized as one of the factors of 
culture. Through this process of integration of culture and language, language becomes 
one of the factors of identity. Yasuda also follows the understandings of scholars of 
cultural studies who maintain that the meaning of culture needs to be understood as 
going from one specific and essential feature of group-identity to a wide and general 
understanding including customs, lifestyles and so on (Yoshimi 2003: 24). Scholars of 
cultural studies usually use the term ‘cultural turn2’ and urge for a change of meaning of 
culture. In the same context, W. Kymlicka (1998: 89-92) insists on the cultural rights of 
minorities, including the right to freedom of speech and expression in their own mother 
language and the right to transmit their language to their children.  
 
These understandings of ethnicity, culture, and language support the common idea that 
such concepts are not absolute. However, in the case where these understandings cling 
to the essential idea of ethnicity, culture, and language, they may oppress the rights of 
minority communities. From this point of view, action towards ethnicity, culture and 
language can be an index by which to understand the ideas the actors rely on. Especially 
the legal actions of a government can show which understanding of ideas that 
government bases itself on. For example, the proposal carried out by the Canadian 
government which admits to organizing an unbalanced federal system on behalf of the 
linguistic minority of French-speaking inhabitants, clearly shows which understanding 
of ideas the government is based on, even if such actions also have another underlying 
meaning of guarding against the country’s separation (Tsuji 2007: 55) . 
 
Based on this point of view, in the next chapter I will analyze the understanding of 
ethnicity, culture, and language held by a specific government.  
 
 
3. Understanding ethnicity, culture and language: the case of the Chinese 
government 
 
In this chapter, I will take a concrete example of a government and analyze this 
government’s understanding of ethnicity, culture, and language. This attempt to evaluate 
the understanding of the given government will help in the evaluation of specific 
government projects. Particularly when the case is related to ethnicity, culture and 
  
language, the understanding of a given government has important meaning. In this paper, 
I will examine the understanding of the Chinese government and, finally, I will 
conclude with an evaluation of the Confucius Institute, a huge project designed to 
diffuse the Chinese language abroad by the Chinese government with the stated goal of 
solely promoting mutual understanding. For this approach, I will mainly examine 
previous research documents in which prominent scholars have analyzed the historical 
phenomena and events proclaimed by the Chinese government after its establishment.  
 
 
3.1 Understanding from the internal policies of China 
 
In this section, I will present evidence regarding Chinese government strategies to 
achieve national unity, first, by neglecting the political autonomy of minorities, second, 
by using nationalism as logic for national unity and third, by economic policies.  
 
I will cite one of the most prominent scholars of Chinese studies, Kazuko Mori. Mori 
(1998) tried to analyze the aims of policies launched by the Chinese government in her 
writing Seeking China from the boundary: the problem of ethnicities and state. Mori 
took examples from China’s law institutions in treating the rights of minority 
communities, particularly the right to autonomy of minority communities. The Chinese 
government still propounds respect of minority communities’ autonomous rights as if it 
admits these rights. Mori’s analysis, however, clearly shows that the autonomous rights 
of minority communities in China do not include self-determination and federation, 
which are agendas the Chinese government promised during the Second World War. 
Mori explains this gap happened for three reasons. Firstly, she insisted this was nothing 
but a propaganda slogan in order to obtain the cooperation of minority communities. 
Secondly, the situation was different to that of the Soviet Union which the Chinese used 
as a model. And thirdly, the Chinese government had stressed nationalism all the way 
through right from the invasion of imperialism (1998: 43-44). To sum up, the Chinese 
government had no concrete plans to transfer the rights of self-determination and 
federation to minority communities. The slogan was an unrealizable but strategic 
propaganda approach with which the Communist Party of China gained the full support 
of the minority communities in order to beat its political rival of the time, i.e. the 
Chinese Nationalist Party. The third reason also explains that nationalism had already 




With regards nationalism as logic for the unity of Chinese society, Mori (2001) states 
that the Chinese government adopted nationalism as a logic of anti-imperialism from 
the period of the organization of the Communist Party of China. Also she pointed out 
the recession of nationalism in China after the period of ‘Chinese economic reform’ and 
insisted that such a situation caused the crisis of social unification (2001: 34-38). 
Against this crisis of social unification, a new logic was created in order to reform the 
identity of China and to strengthen the social unification of China by the Chinese 
researcher, Fei Xiaotong. Fei (1988) argued that the term Zhonghua minzu refers not 
only to the unity of the fifty-six officially recognized nationalities (minzu) living in 
China, but also to the countless ethnonyms recorded throughout the annals of China. 
Mori criticized Fei’s thesis because this kind of reforming identity is nothing more than 
a process of transforming ethnicity to nationality (1998: 75-79, 2001: 30-32). To cite 
Mori directly: “There may exist Renmin (People) as a political identity and Zhonghua 
minzu as a cultural identity in China, however, there does not exist Nation (Guomin) ” 
(1998: 82). Finally she concluded that “Frankly speaking, China as a Nation-State is 
still in the process of Nation-Building”.  
 
In addition to Mori’s analysis of China’s nationalism as logic of social unification, the 
China researcher Ke Wang, suggests another logic in social unification (2006: 273). Wang 
pointed out the change in the central government’s policies from grants-in-aid to direct 
investments for infra-structure in the autonomous districts of the minority communities. 
Wang explained that the central government was positive towards building market-based 
economic systems in the autonomous districts, and was convinced that such steps for 
China’s economic unification would promote social unification3. 
 
 
3.2 Understanding from internal policies of language and language education in China 
 
This section will further the research of the previous section, particularly in respect to 
language. First, I will cite the studies of China’s language policy examined by Masataka 
Okamoto (2008). Okamoto started his work by verifying the general appraisal that 
‘Chinese policy to minority communities is superior’, and examined the examples of 
several Chinese minority communities, including huge communities of Mongolian and 
Korean peoples as well as some smaller groups. He reached the conclusion that four 
factors caused the decline of minority languages. They were: 1) the influence of the 
Cultural Revolution; 2) the movement of populations (inflow of majority, Hanzu, and 
outflow of minorities to cities); 3) the decline in ethnic-language schools (Chinese 
  
language Hanyu education is supported by the education system including entrance 
examinations); 4) the purpose of guidance division (Okamoto 2008: 172-181, 252-255, 
342-345, 477-482). Apart from point 1) the historical event of the Cultural Revolution, 
it is easy to see that points 2) and 3), i.e. movement of populations and decline in ethnic 
schools are directly or indirectly connected to point 4) the purpose of guidance division. 
In other words, it is evident that the movement of population and the decline in 
ethnic-language schools were the intentional consequence of the purpose of guidance 
division. Particularly, intervention in the education system of ethnic schools is an 
inevitable consequence of guidance division. To sum up, these factors show that 
Chinese language policy was used as a method of social unification.  
 
L. J. Calvet (2010: 240-244) agreed with this opinion. Calvet pointed out in his La 
guerre des langues et les politiques linguistiques, that education of Pinyin functions as a 
new inscription used for social unification. This means that the situation forces people 
to learn Pinyin as a new unified language system. Calvet (2010: 178) stated that the 
government project for training official interpreters from the languages of the minority 
communities to standard Chinese (Putonghua) was nothing more than standard 
language education for minorities, as almost all the applicants for the project of training 
official interpreters were minorities. 
 
However, in his conclusion, Okamoto makes an important point regarding ethnic 
language education in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. He points out that in 
the case of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region the tendency is slightly different 
to his overall conclusion4. Okamoto predicts that this situation will change in a few 
years in line with the change seen in other ethnic languages (2008: 396). This particular 
situation gives an important clue as to the connection between internal language 
education and external language education. If language education is limited to internal 
language education, Okamoto’s explanation is probably to the point. However, in 
addition to his conclusion, I would suggest the issue of external language education be 
taken into account. When it comes to the language situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region, there are two main characteristics. One is, as Okamoto pointed out, 
that the situation needs to be resolved for the social unification of China. The other is 
that the situation is almost the same as that of a foreign country5, the area is, as it were, 





Put another way, the language policy towards the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
has the two functions of social unification of China and of test trial for Chinese 
language education abroad. Even Okamoto described this as “full-scale enforcement of 
Hanyu education from 1984 to 1988 (2008: 393-395)”; 1984 was the year that the 
authorized Chinese language test HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi)6 was developed and 
1988 was the year that the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) 
was established (Cheng 2005: 89). That is to say, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region has great potential to be understood not only as ‘the object required to be unified 
with China7’ but also ‘the object selected as a trial for the diffusion of the Chinese 
language business8’. The fact that these two aims are carried out in parallel shows that 
external language education is an extension of internal language education and that it is 
possible to represent internal nationalism as a country’s identity projected towards the 
outside word.  
 
 
3.3 The understanding of Chinese government 
 
From these analyses, an unexpected formational feature of these policies became 
apparent. That is, the formational feature is similar to multiculturalism and 
multilingualism. The reasons are, firstly, the Chinese government accepts that concepts 
of ethnicity and identity are something created, however, it denies the multi-identity of 
Hanzu, a majority group in China. Secondly, it accepts the collective autonomy of 
ethnic minorities while denying self-determination of minority communities. These two 
limitations clearly show the major outline of what the Chinese government seeks to 
achieve. In other words, these two limitations work to emphasize nationalism. For 
example, Wang (2006: 276-279) commented that one of the characteristic features of the 
revised bill of ‘the law of minority communities’ autonomous districts in The People’s 
Republic of China’ on 2001.2.28, is the emphasis on nation rather than ethnicity. And 
Wang takes as example the fact that the Chinese language (Hanyu) became a common 
language among minority communities through the financial and administrative support 
of the Chinese government. 
 
Another researcher, Minglang Zhou (2004) who studies the rights of minority 
communities, insists that the present law regarding minority communities and enacted 
by the Chinese government is not in the spirit of the Chinese constitution, nor does it 
relate to human rights and the language rights of minority communities as collective 
rights (Zhou 2004: 78-81). Zhou concluded that the aim of the language policy carried 
  
out by the Chinese government was to establish Hanyu as the single authoritative 
common language. This was to circumvent movements of independence by minority 
communities relying on their languages, as happened after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The final objective of the Chinese government in establishing one authoritative 
common language is not only to strengthen nationalism but also to achieve social 
unification through such strengthening of nationalism. Based on these opinions, I will 
describe below the possible concept of language held by the Chinese government.  
 
Fig.1. the concept of language and culture (3-layered structure) 
 
 
The formational feature is highly important in the policy of the Chinese government. 
The problem is that this formational feature is not understood as the first step in 
multiculturalism and multilingualism but understood as a situation to be fixed. Simply 
put, the formational feature functions as wrapping paper to screen the real aim. 
Generally, this situation appears in all countries wavering between social unification and 
multiculturalism. However, in the case of China, there is only the concept of modern 
nation-state and national interest gained from protection of its borders.  
 
 
4. The understanding with two characteristic features of China’s language policy  
 
In this chapter, I will consider the history of developments regarding external language 
policy, highlighting the significance of these developments. 
 
As examined above, the Chinese government has strict understandings of ethnicity, 
culture and language. For this paper, I will take the example of a specific government 
project, the Confucius Institute, which was created for the diffusion of the Chinese 
language abroad. This case particularly shows how these understandings are reflected in  
 
  
government undertakings. In this chapter, I will examine the external language policy of 
the Chinese government from the viewpoint of internal language policy.  
 
After the Second World War the Chinese government implemented a language policy 
that sought to simplify written Chinese and create a standard language. However, due to 
the huge area of the country, the implementation of a standard language could not 
function throughout the whole of the country (Iida 2008: 14-17). To counter this 
situation, the government exploited the broadcasting systems with a certain degree of 
success (Calvet 2000: 77-81). But within China there was criticism such as “even 
though everyone says he or she speaks standard Chinese (Putonghua), in fact, he or she 
merely speaks a dialect which sounds like standard Chinese (Putonghua)” (Zhang 2009: 
105). Actually, the language policy in China is still a work in progress and there are still 
certain difficulties to overcome to complete this work (Iida 2008: 26-33). Particularly, 
people who cannot speak or write standard Chinese need continuous language education  
(Zhang 2009: 104) and this means that Chinese language education has no limit of 
learners who hold Chinese nationality. This special situation originates from the wide 
gap between the standard language and dialects. Here, language education is considered 
internal language education from the concept of territory, whereas in actual fact there is 
no difference between internal and external language education from the point of 
educational content.  
 
As mentioned in section 3.2 above, the internal language policy of China is connected 
to the external language policy. Furthermore, these two types of language policy are 
both leading government policies. With regards the internal language policy, this has 
already been clarified in the discussion of Okamoto above. As for the internal language 
policy, the external language policy bears the characteristic features of any leading 
government policy. For example, the external language policy in the 1980s was carried 
out mainly by the ‘Beijing Language Institute’ which was a center for teaching the 
Chinese language to foreign students (Cheng 2005: 89). In the sense that it limited its 
object to foreign students in China, such policy was a relatively passive one. Though, 
after the establishment of the Office of Chinese Language Council International 
(Hanban) in 1988, this changed dramatically to become an active one. The main 
objectives also changed from merely the education of foreign students to the 





For the establishment of Hanban, there were other movements in the external language 
policy. For instance, the authorized Chinese language test HSK (Hanyu Shuiping 
Kaoshi) was already developed by 1984, before the establishment of Hanban, by the 
‘Beijing Language Institute’. So though it would seem a dramatic conversion to active 
and aggressive tactics, the main direction of the Chinese external language policy had 
already been set out. Cheng (2005: 171) described this conversion as “turning from 
empirical teaching to scientific teaching”, when he categorized this history of Chinese 
external language policy. The epoch-making event in Cheng’s category is, needless to 
say, the establishment of Hanban.  
 
After the establishment of Hanban, the speed of implementation of projects accelerated. 
In 1993, the ‘International Training Center of Chinese language (=国际汉语培训中心)’ 
was established. And in 2000, the name of ‘International Training Center of Chinese 
language’ was changed to ‘College of Chinese language and culture (=汉语文化学院)’ 
(Cheng 2005: 263). Moreover, in 1996 the ‘Beijing Language Institute’ was promoted to 
the status of ‘Beijing Language and Culture University (BLCU)9’. The Confucius 
Institute is part of the large-scale project of Chinese external language policy. As I 
mentioned above, this large-scale external language policy project works in 
coordination with the Chinese internal language policy. Other evidence clearly explains 
this deep relation. More than half of all the applicants for the Chinese language test 
HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi) are from minority communities in China10. This shows 
that HSK functions not only as an educational method for foreigners but also takes on 
the role of standard language test.  
 
 
5. Concluding comments: establishing a new political approach to external 
language policy 
 
In this paper, I have examined the understanding of the Chinese government through the 
relation of historical events. Shortly to say, the concept of language of the Chinese 
government is close to one of means of social unification. Particularly the language 
policies concerning the internal area of the country and territories external to the 
country are deeply connected. This relation shows that there is great possibility to 
transfer the nationalism fostered in the internal language policy directly to the external 
language policy. This unique relation, constructed with intent by the Chinese 
government, becomes apparent from the fact that the main objective of the external 
language policy is unilateral education and not mutual exchange. For example, the 
  
Confucius Institute, as an external language policy, declares its goals as a campaign for 
advocating language diversity and promoting Chinese soft power Aside from the 
understanding of the concept of soft power11, when it comes to language diversity, its 
language policy was proved to contradict itself. Even though the Chinese government 
ostensibly emphasizes language diversity as the goal of the Confucius Institute, its 
behavior towards the languages of minority communities within China demonstrates 
that it is not concerned at all with the extinction of languages.  
 
To conclude, this series of attitudes by the Chinese government demonstrates which 
understanding it holds of language, and furthermore of the concepts of culture and 
ethnicity. The Chinese government puts much stress on its own interests regarding its 
political and economical power. Such power could easily be gained under a unified 
society, and this situation forces a particular understanding of language and culture which 
regards them as methods of unification. Taken to the extreme, the selection undertaken by 
the Chinese government in its external language policy, is not the smooth diffusion of 
replacing Chinese characters by the Roman alphabet (Calvet 2000: 79-81, 2010: 236-245), 
but the emphasis of China’s identity in maintaining symbolic Chinese characters.  
 
I believe this research could provide a theoretical scale with which to measure not only 
the language policy of China, but also the language policies of any other given country. 
 
 
                                                   
1 There is some controversy regarding the concept of culture. For example, even if the concept is understood as a 
constructed one, the problem still exists of whether that constructed concept of culture follows the way of history 
or not. In this paper, I have treated these complicated concepts simply as two opposites, such as essential and 
constructed. For further information, see ‘WILLAMS Raymond (1981) Culture, London: Fontana Press’ 
2 This title was used in JAMESON (1998) and BONNELL et al. (1999) with the same meaning. 
3 Concerning government steps connected to economic development, LIU (2007: 39-47) argues that such steps could 
be the last strategy for social unification without conflict from ethnic groups. For further information, see ‘LIU Zhi
劉稚 (2007). 
4 ABLIMIT (1995: 218) states that over 90% of Uyghur pupils in elementary and middle schools learn their ethnical 
language, even during the 1990s. 
5 The Uyghur population is estimated at about 8 million, according to CHINAXINJIANG.CN from November 25, 2009.  
6 For further information, see the webpage of HSK Center below.  
7 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region declared its independence as ‘East Turkestan Republic’ twice. For further 
Information, see WANG Ke王柯 (1995).  
8 While Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has a connection to ‘East Turkestan’, the trial operations of the 
Confucius Institute progressed in Uzbekistan which is regarded as a member country of ‘West Turkestan’. The 
group of ‘West Turkestan’ is comprised of five countries: Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.  
9 For further information, see the webpage of BLCU below. 
10 For further information, see the webpage of People’s Daily Online from January 17, 2006: “The applicants for 
HSK pass over 1 million” 
11 About the definition of soft power, LEE (2010) analyzed that the concept of soft power has two ambiguous 
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